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Tomcat example source code file (sslutils.c)
The Tomcat sslutils.c source code/* Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one or more * contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file distributed with * this work for additional information regarding copyright ownership. * The ASF licenses this file to You under the Apache License, Version 2.0 * (the "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with * the License. You may obtain a copy of the License at * * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 * * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. */ /** SSL Utilities * * @author Mladen Turk * @version $Revision: 479112 $, $Date: 2006-11-25 11:22:33 +0100 (sam., 25 nov. 2006) $ */ #include "tcn.h" #include "apr_thread_mutex.h" #include "apr_poll.h" #ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL #include "ssl_private.h" #ifdef WIN32 extern int WIN32_SSL_password_prompt(tcn_pass_cb_t *data); #endif /* _________________________________________________________________ ** ** Additional High-Level Functions for OpenSSL ** _________________________________________________________________ */ /* we initialize this index at startup time * and never write to it at request time, * so this static is thread safe. * also note that OpenSSL increments at static variable when * SSL_get_ex_new_index() is called, so we _must_ do this at startup. */ static int SSL_app_data2_idx = -1; void SSL_init_app_data2_idx(void) { int i; if (SSL_app_data2_idx > -1) { return; } /* we _do_ need to call this twice */ for (i = 0; i <= 1; i++) { SSL_app_data2_idx = SSL_get_ex_new_index(0, "Second Application Data for SSL", NULL, NULL, NULL); } } void *SSL_get_app_data2(SSL *ssl) { return (void *)SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, SSL_app_data2_idx); } void SSL_set_app_data2(SSL *ssl, void *arg) { SSL_set_ex_data(ssl, SSL_app_data2_idx, (char *)arg); return; } /* Simple echo password prompting */ int SSL_password_prompt(tcn_pass_cb_t *data) { int rv = 0; data->password[0] = '\0'; if (data->cb.obj) { JNIEnv *e; jobject o; jstring prompt; tcn_get_java_env(&e); prompt = AJP_TO_JSTRING(data->prompt); if ((o = (*e)->CallObjectMethod(e, data->cb.obj, data->cb.mid[0], prompt))) { TCN_ALLOC_CSTRING(o); if (J2S(o)) { strncpy(data->password, J2S(o), SSL_MAX_PASSWORD_LEN); data->password[SSL_MAX_PASSWORD_LEN-1] = '\0'; rv = (int)strlen(data->password); } TCN_FREE_CSTRING(o); } } else { #ifdef WIN32 rv = WIN32_SSL_password_prompt(data); #else EVP_read_pw_string(data->password, SSL_MAX_PASSWORD_LEN, data->prompt, 0); #endif rv = (int)strlen(data->password); } if (rv > 0) { /* Remove LF char if present */ char *r = strchr(data->password, '\n'); if (r) { *r = '\0'; rv--; } #ifdef WIN32 if ((r = strchr(data->password, '\r'))) { *r = '\0'; rv--; } #endif } return rv; } int SSL_password_callback(char *buf, int bufsiz, int verify, void *cb) { tcn_pass_cb_t *cb_data = (tcn_pass_cb_t *)cb; if (buf == NULL) return 0; *buf = '\0'; if (cb_data == NULL) cb_data = &tcn_password_callback; if (!cb_data->prompt) cb_data->prompt = SSL_DEFAULT_PASS_PROMPT; if (cb_data->password[0]) { /* Return already obtained password */ strncpy(buf, cb_data->password, bufsiz); buf[bufsiz - 1] = '\0'; return (int)strlen(buf); } else { if (SSL_password_prompt(cb_data) > 0) strncpy(buf, cb_data->password, bufsiz); } buf[bufsiz - 1] = '\0'; return (int)strlen(buf); } static unsigned char dh0512_p[]={ 0xD9,0xBA,0xBF,0xFD,0x69,0x38,0xC9,0x51,0x2D,0x19,0x37,0x39, 0xD7,0x7D,0x7E,0x3E,0x25,0x58,0x55,0x94,0x90,0x60,0x93,0x7A, 0xF2,0xD5,0x61,0x5F,0x06,0xE8,0x08,0xB4,0x57,0xF4,0xCF,0xB4, 0x41,0xCC,0xC4,0xAC,0xD4,0xF0,0x45,0x88,0xC9,0xD1,0x21,0x4C, 0xB6,0x72,0x48,0xBD,0x73,0x80,0xE0,0xDD,0x88,0x41,0xA0,0xF1, 0xEA,0x4B,0x71,0x13 }; static unsigned char dh1024_p[]={ 0xA2,0x95,0x7E,0x7C,0xA9,0xD5,0x55,0x1D,0x7C,0x77,0x11,0xAC, 0xFD,0x48,0x8C,0x3B,0x94,0x1B,0xC5,0xC0,0x99,0x93,0xB5,0xDC, 0xDC,0x06,0x76,0x9E,0xED,0x1E,0x3D,0xBB,0x9A,0x29,0xD6,0x8B, 0x1F,0xF6,0xDA,0xC9,0xDF,0xD5,0x02,0x4F,0x09,0xDE,0xEC,0x2C, 0x59,0x1E,0x82,0x32,0x80,0x9B,0xED,0x51,0x68,0xD2,0xFB,0x1E, 0x25,0xDB,0xDF,0x9C,0x11,0x70,0xDF,0xCA,0x19,0x03,0x3D,0x3D, 0xC1,0xAC,0x28,0x88,0x4F,0x13,0xAF,0x16,0x60,0x6B,0x5B,0x2F, 0x56,0xC7,0x5B,0x5D,0xDE,0x8F,0x50,0x08,0xEC,0xB1,0xB9,0x29, 0xAA,0x54,0xF4,0x05,0xC9,0xDF,0x95,0x9D,0x79,0xC6,0xEA,0x3F, 0xC9,0x70,0x42,0xDA,0x90,0xC7,0xCC,0x12,0xB9,0x87,0x86,0x39, 0x1E,0x1A,0xCE,0xF7,0x3F,0x15,0xB5,0x2B }; static unsigned char dh2048_p[]={ 0xF2,0x4A,0xFC,0x7E,0x73,0x48,0x21,0x03,0xD1,0x1D,0xA8,0x16, 0x87,0xD0,0xD2,0xDC,0x42,0xA8,0xD2,0x73,0xE3,0xA9,0x21,0x31, 0x70,0x5D,0x69,0xC7,0x8F,0x95,0x0C,0x9F,0xB8,0x0E,0x37,0xAE, 0xD1,0x6F,0x36,0x1C,0x26,0x63,0x2A,0x36,0xBA,0x0D,0x2A,0xF5, 0x1A,0x0F,0xE8,0xC0,0xEA,0xD1,0xB5,0x52,0x47,0x1F,0x9A,0x0C, 0x0F,0xED,0x71,0x51,0xED,0xE6,0x62,0xD5,0xF8,0x81,0x93,0x55, 0xC1,0x0F,0xB4,0x72,0x64,0xB3,0x73,0xAA,0x90,0x9A,0x81,0xCE, 0x03,0xFD,0x6D,0xB1,0x27,0x7D,0xE9,0x90,0x5E,0xE2,0x10,0x74, 0x4F,0x94,0xC3,0x05,0x21,0x73,0xA9,0x12,0x06,0x9B,0x0E,0x20, 0xD1,0x5F,0xF7,0xC9,0x4C,0x9D,0x4F,0xFA,0xCA,0x4D,0xFD,0xFF, 0x6A,0x62,0x9F,0xF0,0x0F,0x3B,0xA9,0x1D,0xF2,0x69,0x29,0x00, 0xBD,0xE9,0xB0,0x9D,0x88,0xC7,0x4A,0xAE,0xB0,0x53,0xAC,0xA2, 0x27,0x40,0x88,0x58,0x8F,0x26,0xB2,0xC2,0x34,0x7D,0xA2,0xCF, 0x92,0x60,0x9B,0x35,0xF6,0xF3,0x3B,0xC3,0xAA,0xD8,0x58,0x9C, 0xCF,0x5D,0x9F,0xDB,0x14,0x93,0xFA,0xA3,0xFA,0x44,0xB1,0xB2, 0x4B,0x0F,0x08,0x70,0x44,0x71,0x3A,0x73,0x45,0x8E,0x6D,0x9C, 0x56,0xBC,0x9A,0xB5,0xB1,0x3D,0x8B,0x1F,0x1E,0x2B,0x0E,0x93, 0xC2,0x9B,0x84,0xE2,0xE8,0xFC,0x29,0x85,0x83,0x8D,0x2E,0x5C, 0xDD,0x9A,0xBB,0xFD,0xF0,0x87,0xBF,0xAF,0xC4,0xB6,0x1D,0xE7, 0xF9,0x46,0x50,0x7F,0xC3,0xAC,0xFD,0xC9,0x8C,0x9D,0x66,0x6B, 0x4C,0x6A,0xC9,0x3F,0x0C,0x0A,0x74,0x94,0x41,0x85,0x26,0x8F, 0x9F,0xF0,0x7C,0x0B }; static unsigned char dh4096_p[] = { 0x8D,0xD3,0x8F,0x77,0x6F,0x6F,0xB0,0x74,0x3F,0x22,0xE9,0xD1, 0x17,0x15,0x69,0xD8,0x24,0x85,0xCD,0xC4,0xE4,0x0E,0xF6,0x52, 0x40,0xF7,0x1C,0x34,0xD0,0xA5,0x20,0x77,0xE2,0xFC,0x7D,0xA1, 0x82,0xF1,0xF3,0x78,0x95,0x05,0x5B,0xB8,0xDB,0xB3,0xE4,0x17, 0x93,0xD6,0x68,0xA7,0x0A,0x0C,0xC5,0xBB,0x9C,0x5E,0x1E,0x83, 0x72,0xB3,0x12,0x81,0xA2,0xF5,0xCD,0x44,0x67,0xAA,0xE8,0xAD, 0x1E,0x8F,0x26,0x25,0xF2,0x8A,0xA0,0xA5,0xF4,0xFB,0x95,0xAE, 0x06,0x50,0x4B,0xD0,0xE7,0x0C,0x55,0x88,0xAA,0xE6,0xB8,0xF6, 0xE9,0x2F,0x8D,0xA7,0xAD,0x84,0xBC,0x8D,0x4C,0xFE,0x76,0x60, 0xCD,0xC8,0xED,0x7C,0xBF,0xF3,0xC1,0xF8,0x6A,0xED,0xEC,0xE9, 0x13,0x7D,0x4E,0x72,0x20,0x77,0x06,0xA4,0x12,0xF8,0xD2,0x34, 0x6F,0xDC,0x97,0xAB,0xD3,0xA0,0x45,0x8E,0x7D,0x21,0xA9,0x35, 0x6E,0xE4,0xC9,0xC4,0x53,0xFF,0xE5,0xD9,0x72,0x61,0xC4,0x8A, 0x75,0x78,0x36,0x97,0x1A,0xAB,0x92,0x85,0x74,0x61,0x7B,0xE0, 0x92,0xB8,0xC6,0x12,0xA1,0x72,0xBB,0x5B,0x61,0xAA,0xE6,0x2C, 0x2D,0x9F,0x45,0x79,0x9E,0xF4,0x41,0x93,0x93,0xEF,0x8B,0xEF, 0xB7,0xBF,0x6D,0xF0,0x91,0x11,0x4F,0x7C,0x71,0x84,0xB5,0x88, 0xA3,0x8C,0x1A,0xD5,0xD0,0x81,0x9C,0x50,0xAC,0xA9,0x2B,0xE9, 0x92,0x2D,0x73,0x7C,0x0A,0xA3,0xFA,0xD3,0x6C,0x91,0x43,0xA6, 0x80,0x7F,0xD7,0xC4,0xD8,0x6F,0x85,0xF8,0x15,0xFD,0x08,0xA6, 0xF8,0x7B,0x3A,0xF4,0xD3,0x50,0xB4,0x2F,0x75,0xC8,0x48,0xB8, 0xA8,0xFD,0xCA,0x8F,0x62,0xF1,0x4C,0x89,0xB7,0x18,0x67,0xB2, 0x93,0x2C,0xC4,0xD4,0x71,0x29,0xA9,0x26,0x20,0xED,0x65,0x37, 0x06,0x87,0xFC,0xFB,0x65,0x02,0x1B,0x3C,0x52,0x03,0xA1,0xBB, 0xCF,0xE7,0x1B,0xA4,0x1A,0xE3,0x94,0x97,0x66,0x06,0xBF,0xA9, 0xCE,0x1B,0x07,0x10,0xBA,0xF8,0xD4,0xD4,0x05,0xCF,0x53,0x47, 0x16,0x2C,0xA1,0xFC,0x6B,0xEF,0xF8,0x6C,0x23,0x34,0xEF,0xB7, 0xD3,0x3F,0xC2,0x42,0x5C,0x53,0x9A,0x00,0x52,0xCF,0xAC,0x42, 0xD3,0x3B,0x2E,0xB6,0x04,0x32,0xE1,0x09,0xED,0x64,0xCD,0x6A, 0x63,0x58,0xB8,0x43,0x56,0x5A,0xBE,0xA4,0x9F,0x68,0xD4,0xF7, 0xC9,0x04,0xDF,0xCD,0xE5,0x93,0xB0,0x2F,0x06,0x19,0x3E,0xB8, 0xAB,0x7E,0xF8,0xE7,0xE7,0xC8,0x53,0xA2,0x06,0xC3,0xC7,0xF9, 0x18,0x3B,0x51,0xC3,0x9B,0xFF,0x8F,0x00,0x0E,0x87,0x19,0x68, 0x2F,0x40,0xC0,0x68,0xFA,0x12,0xAE,0x57,0xB5,0xF0,0x97,0xCA, 0x78,0x23,0x31,0xAB,0x67,0x7B,0x10,0x6B,0x59,0x32,0x9C,0x64, 0x20,0x38,0x1F,0xC5,0x07,0x84,0x9E,0xC4,0x49,0xB1,0xDF,0xED, 0x7A,0x8A,0xC3,0xE0,0xDD,0x30,0x55,0xFF,0x95,0x45,0xA6,0xEE, 0xCB,0xE4,0x26,0xB9,0x8E,0x89,0x37,0x63,0xD4,0x02,0x3D,0x5B, 0x4F,0xE5,0x90,0xF6,0x72,0xF8,0x10,0xEE,0x31,0x04,0x54,0x17, 0xE3,0xD5,0x63,0x84,0x80,0x62,0x54,0x46,0x85,0x6C,0xD2,0xC1, 0x3E,0x19,0xBD,0xE2,0x80,0x11,0x86,0xC7,0x4B,0x7F,0x67,0x86, 0x47,0xD2,0x38,0xCD,0x8F,0xFE,0x65,0x3C,0x11,0xCD,0x96,0x99, 0x4E,0x45,0xEB,0xEC,0x1D,0x94,0x8C,0x53, }; static unsigned char dhxxx2_g[]={ 0x02 }; static DH *get_dh(int idx) { DH *dh; if ((dh = DH_new()) == NULL) return NULL; switch (idx) { case SSL_TMP_KEY_DH_512: dh->p = BN_bin2bn(dh0512_p, sizeof(dh0512_p), NULL); break; case SSL_TMP_KEY_DH_1024: dh->p = BN_bin2bn(dh1024_p, sizeof(dh1024_p), NULL); break; case SSL_TMP_KEY_DH_2048: dh->p = BN_bin2bn(dh2048_p, sizeof(dh2048_p), NULL); break; case SSL_TMP_KEY_DH_4096: dh->p = BN_bin2bn(dh4096_p, sizeof(dh2048_p), NULL); break; } dh->g = BN_bin2bn(dhxxx2_g, sizeof(dhxxx2_g), NULL); if ((dh->p == NULL) || (dh->g == NULL)) { DH_free(dh); return NULL; } else return dh; } DH *SSL_dh_get_tmp_param(int key_len) { DH *dh; if (key_len == 512) dh = get_dh(SSL_TMP_KEY_DH_512); else if (key_len == 1024) dh = get_dh(SSL_TMP_KEY_DH_1024); else if (key_len == 2048) dh = get_dh(SSL_TMP_KEY_DH_2048); else if (key_len == 4096) dh = get_dh(SSL_TMP_KEY_DH_4096); else dh = get_dh(SSL_TMP_KEY_DH_1024); return dh; } DH *SSL_dh_get_param_from_file(const char *file) { DH *dh = NULL; BIO *bio; if ((bio = BIO_new_file(file, "r")) == NULL) return NULL; dh = PEM_read_bio_DHparams(bio, NULL, NULL, NULL); BIO_free(bio); return dh; } /* * Handle out temporary RSA private keys on demand * * The background of this as the TLSv1 standard explains it: * * | D.1. Temporary RSA keys * | * | US Export restrictions limit RSA keys used for encryption to 512 * | bits, but do not place any limit on lengths of RSA keys used for * | signing operations. Certificates often need to be larger than 512 * | bits, since 512-bit RSA keys are not secure enough for high-value * | transactions or for applications requiring long-term security. Some * | certificates are also designated signing-only, in which case they * | cannot be used for key exchange. * | * | When the public key in the certificate cannot be used for encryption, * | the server signs a temporary RSA key, which is then exchanged. In * | exportable applications, the temporary RSA key should be the maximum * | allowable length (i.e., 512 bits). Because 512-bit RSA keys are * | relatively insecure, they should be changed often. For typical * | electronic commerce applications, it is suggested that keys be * | changed daily or every 500 transactions, and more often if possible. * | Note that while it is acceptable to use the same temporary key for * | multiple transactions, it must be signed each time it is used. * | * | RSA key generation is a time-consuming process. In many cases, a * | low-priority process can be assigned the task of key generation. * | Whenever a new key is completed, the existing temporary key can be * | replaced with the new one. * * XXX: base on comment above, if thread support is enabled, * we should spawn a low-priority thread to generate new keys * on the fly. * * So we generated 512 and 1024 bit temporary keys on startup * which we now just hand out on demand.... */ RSA *SSL_callback_tmp_RSA(SSL *ssl, int export, int keylen) { int idx; /* doesn't matter if export flag is on, * we won't be asked for keylen > 512 in that case. * if we are asked for a keylen > 1024, it is too expensive * to generate on the fly. */ switch (keylen) { case 512: idx = SSL_TMP_KEY_RSA_512; break; case 2048: idx = SSL_TMP_KEY_RSA_2048; if (SSL_temp_keys[idx] == NULL) idx = SSL_TMP_KEY_RSA_1024; break; case 4096: idx = SSL_TMP_KEY_RSA_4096; if (SSL_temp_keys[idx] == NULL) idx = SSL_TMP_KEY_RSA_2048; break; case 1024: default: idx = SSL_TMP_KEY_RSA_1024; break; } return (RSA *)SSL_temp_keys[idx]; } /* * Hand out the already generated DH parameters... */ DH *SSL_callback_tmp_DH(SSL *ssl, int export, int keylen) { int idx; switch (keylen) { case 512: idx = SSL_TMP_KEY_DH_512; break; case 2048: idx = SSL_TMP_KEY_DH_2048; break; case 4096: idx = SSL_TMP_KEY_DH_4096; break; case 1024: default: idx = SSL_TMP_KEY_DH_1024; break; } return (DH *)SSL_temp_keys[idx]; } void SSL_vhost_algo_id(const unsigned char *vhost_id, unsigned char *md, int algo) { MD5_CTX c; MD5_Init(&c); MD5_Update(&c, vhost_id, MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH); switch (algo) { case SSL_ALGO_UNKNOWN: MD5_Update(&c, "UNKNOWN", 7); break; case SSL_ALGO_RSA: MD5_Update(&c, "RSA", 3); break; case SSL_ALGO_DSA: MD5_Update(&c, "DSA", 3); break; } MD5_Final(md, &c); } /* * Read a file that optionally contains the server certificate in PEM * format, possibly followed by a sequence of CA certificates that * should be sent to the peer in the SSL Certificate message. */ int SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *file, int skipfirst) { BIO *bio; X509 *x509; unsigned long err; int n; STACK *extra_certs; if ((bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_file_internal())) == NULL) return -1; if (BIO_read_filename(bio, file) <= 0) { BIO_free(bio); return -1; } /* optionally skip a leading server certificate */ if (skipfirst) { if ((x509 = PEM_read_bio_X509(bio, NULL, NULL, NULL)) == NULL) { BIO_free(bio); return -1; } X509_free(x509); } /* free a perhaps already configured extra chain */ extra_certs = SSL_CTX_get_extra_certs(ctx); if (extra_certs != NULL) { sk_X509_pop_free((STACK_OF(X509) *)extra_certs, X509_free); SSL_CTX_set_extra_certs(ctx,NULL); } /* create new extra chain by loading the certs */ n = 0; while ((x509 = PEM_read_bio_X509(bio, NULL, NULL, NULL)) != NULL) { if (!SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert(ctx, x509)) { X509_free(x509); BIO_free(bio); return -1; } n++; } /* Make sure that only the error is just an EOF */ if ((err = ERR_peek_error()) > 0) { if (!( ERR_GET_LIB(err) == ERR_LIB_PEM && ERR_GET_REASON(err) == PEM_R_NO_START_LINE)) { BIO_free(bio); return -1; } while (ERR_get_error() > 0) ; } BIO_free(bio); return n; } static int ssl_X509_STORE_lookup(X509_STORE *store, int yype, X509_NAME *name, X509_OBJECT *obj) { X509_STORE_CTX ctx; int rc; X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx, store, NULL, NULL); rc = X509_STORE_get_by_subject(&ctx, yype, name, obj); X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); return rc; } static int ssl_verify_CRL(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, tcn_ssl_conn_t *con) { X509_OBJECT obj; X509_NAME *subject, *issuer; X509 *cert; X509_CRL *crl; EVP_PKEY *pubkey; int i, n, rc; /* * Determine certificate ingredients in advance */ cert = X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(ctx); subject = X509_get_subject_name(cert); issuer = X509_get_issuer_name(cert); /* * OpenSSL provides the general mechanism to deal with CRLs but does not * use them automatically when verifying certificates, so we do it * explicitly here. We will check the CRL for the currently checked * certificate, if there is such a CRL in the store. * * We come through this procedure for each certificate in the certificate * chain, starting with the root-CA's certificate. At each step we've to * both verify the signature on the CRL (to make sure it's a valid CRL) * and it's revocation list (to make sure the current certificate isn't * revoked). But because to check the signature on the CRL we need the * public key of the issuing CA certificate (which was already processed * one round before), we've a little problem. But we can both solve it and * at the same time optimize the processing by using the following * verification scheme (idea and code snippets borrowed from the GLOBUS * project): * * 1. We'll check the signature of a CRL in each step when we find a CRL * through the _subject_ name of the current certificate. This CRL * itself will be needed the first time in the next round, of course. * But we do the signature processing one round before this where the * public key of the CA is available. * * 2. We'll check the revocation list of a CRL in each step when * we find a CRL through the _issuer_ name of the current certificate. * This CRLs signature was then already verified one round before. * * This verification scheme allows a CA to revoke its own certificate as * well, of course. */ /* * Try to retrieve a CRL corresponding to the _subject_ of * the current certificate in order to verify it's integrity. */ memset((char *)&obj, 0, sizeof(obj)); rc = ssl_X509_STORE_lookup(con->ctx->crl, X509_LU_CRL, subject, &obj); crl = obj.data.crl; if ((rc > 0) && crl) { /* * Log information about CRL * (A little bit complicated because of ASN.1 and BIOs...) */ /* * Verify the signature on this CRL */ pubkey = X509_get_pubkey(cert); rc = X509_CRL_verify(crl, pubkey); /* Only refcounted in OpenSSL */ if (pubkey) EVP_PKEY_free(pubkey); if (rc <= 0) { /* TODO: Log Invalid signature on CRL */ X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE); X509_OBJECT_free_contents(&obj); return 0; } /* * Check date of CRL to make sure it's not expired */ i = X509_cmp_current_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl)); if (i == 0) { /* TODO: Log Found CRL has invalid nextUpdate field */ X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD); X509_OBJECT_free_contents(&obj); return 0; } if (i < 0) { /* TODO: Log Found CRL is expired */ X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED); X509_OBJECT_free_contents(&obj); return 0; } X509_OBJECT_free_contents(&obj); } /* * Try to retrieve a CRL corresponding to the _issuer_ of * the current certificate in order to check for revocation. */ memset((char *)&obj, 0, sizeof(obj)); rc = ssl_X509_STORE_lookup(con->ctx->crl, X509_LU_CRL, issuer, &obj); crl = obj.data.crl; if ((rc > 0) && crl) { /* * Check if the current certificate is revoked by this CRL */ n = sk_X509_REVOKED_num(X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(crl)); for (i = 0; i < n; i++) { X509_REVOKED *revoked = sk_X509_REVOKED_value(X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(crl), i); ASN1_INTEGER *sn = revoked->serialNumber; if (!ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(sn, X509_get_serialNumber(cert))) { X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED); X509_OBJECT_free_contents(&obj); return 0; } } X509_OBJECT_free_contents(&obj); } return ok; } /* * This OpenSSL callback function is called when OpenSSL * does client authentication and verifies the certificate chain. */ int SSL_callback_SSL_verify(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { /* Get Apache context back through OpenSSL context */ SSL *ssl = X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(ctx, SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx()); tcn_ssl_conn_t *con = (tcn_ssl_conn_t *)SSL_get_app_data(ssl); /* Get verify ingredients */ int errnum = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx); int errdepth = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(ctx); int verify = con->ctx->verify_mode; int depth = con->ctx->verify_depth; if (verify == SSL_CVERIFY_UNSET || verify == SSL_CVERIFY_NONE) return 1; if (SSL_VERIFY_ERROR_IS_OPTIONAL(errnum) && (verify == SSL_CVERIFY_OPTIONAL_NO_CA)) { ok = 1; SSL_set_verify_result(ssl, X509_V_OK); } /* * Additionally perform CRL-based revocation checks */ if (ok && con->ctx->crl) { if (!(ok = ssl_verify_CRL(ok, ctx, con))) { errnum = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx); /* TODO: Log something */ } } /* * If we already know it's not ok, log the real reason */ if (!ok) { /* TODO: Some logging * Certificate Verification: Error */ if (con->peer) { X509_free(con->peer); con->peer = NULL; } } if (errdepth > depth) { /* TODO: Some logging * Certificate Verification: Certificate Chain too long */ ok = 0; } return ok; } #endif Other Tomcat examples (source code examples)Here is a short list of links related to this Tomcat sslutils.c source code file: |
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